Social decision mechanisms that admit dominant strategies and result in Pareto optima are characterized by the class of mechanisms proposed by Groves. The concept of decision mechanisms is generalized and the characterization is shown to extend to these cases.
MLA
Laffont, Jean-Jacques, and Jerry Green. “Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods.” Econometrica, vol. 45, .no 2, Econometric Society, 1977, pp. 427-438, https://www.jstor.org/stable/1911219
Chicago
Laffont, Jean-Jacques, and Jerry Green. “Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods.” Econometrica, 45, .no 2, (Econometric Society: 1977), 427-438. https://www.jstor.org/stable/1911219
APA
Laffont, J.-J., & Green, J. (1977). Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods. Econometrica, 45(2), 427-438. https://www.jstor.org/stable/1911219
We are deeply saddened by the passing of Kate Ho, the John L. Weinberg Professor of Economics and Business Policy at Princeton University and a Fellow of the Econometric Society. Kate was a brilliant IO economist and scholar whose impact on the profession will resonate for many years to come.
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