This paper shows that no nondictatorial voting procedure exists that induces each voter to choose his voting strategy solely on the basis of his preferences and independently of his beliefs concerning other voters' preferences. This necessary dependence between a voter's beliefs and his choice of strategy means that a voter can manipulate another voter's choice of strategy by misleading him into adopting inaccurate beliefs concerning other voters' beliefs.
MLA
Blin, Jean-Marie, and Mark A. Satterthwaite. “On Preferences, Beliefs, and Manipulation within Voting Situations.” Econometrica, vol. 45, .no 4, Econometric Society, 1977, pp. 881-888, https://www.jstor.org/stable/1912678
Chicago
Blin, Jean-Marie, and Mark A. Satterthwaite. “On Preferences, Beliefs, and Manipulation within Voting Situations.” Econometrica, 45, .no 4, (Econometric Society: 1977), 881-888. https://www.jstor.org/stable/1912678
APA
Blin, J.-M., & Satterthwaite, M. A. (1977). On Preferences, Beliefs, and Manipulation within Voting Situations. Econometrica, 45(4), 881-888. https://www.jstor.org/stable/1912678
We are deeply saddened by the passing of Kate Ho, the John L. Weinberg Professor of Economics and Business Policy at Princeton University and a Fellow of the Econometric Society. Kate was a brilliant IO economist and scholar whose impact on the profession will resonate for many years to come.
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