A noncooperative implementation of the core is provided for games with transferable utility. The implementation obtained here is meant to reflect the standard motivation for the core as closely as possible. In the model proposed, time is continuous. This idealized treatment of time ensures that there is always time to reject a noncore proposal before it is consumated.
MLA
Perry, Motty, and Philip J. Reny. “A Noncooperative View of Coalition Formation and the Core.” Econometrica, vol. 62, .no 4, Econometric Society, 1994, pp. 795-817, https://www.jstor.org/stable/2951733
Chicago
Perry, Motty, and Philip J. Reny. “A Noncooperative View of Coalition Formation and the Core.” Econometrica, 62, .no 4, (Econometric Society: 1994), 795-817. https://www.jstor.org/stable/2951733
APA
Perry, M., & Reny, P. J. (1994). A Noncooperative View of Coalition Formation and the Core. Econometrica, 62(4), 795-817. https://www.jstor.org/stable/2951733
We are deeply saddened by the passing of Kate Ho, the John L. Weinberg Professor of Economics and Business Policy at Princeton University and a Fellow of the Econometric Society. Kate was a brilliant IO economist and scholar whose impact on the profession will resonate for many years to come.
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