Gerald R. Uhlich, Michael Mitzkewitz, Reinhard Selten
The strategy method asks experienced subjects to program strategies for a game. This paper reports on an application to a 20-period supergame of an asymmetric Cournot duopoly. The final strategies after three programming rounds show a typical structure. Typically, no expectations are formed and nothing is optimized. Instead of this, fairness criteria are used to determine cooperative goals, called "ideal points." The subjects try to achieve cooperation by a "measure-for-measure policy," which reciprocates movements towards and away from the ideal point by similar movements. A strategy tends to be more successful the more typical it is.
MLA
Uhlich, Gerald R., et al. “Duopoly Strategies Programmed by Experienced Players.” Econometrica, vol. 65, .no 3, Econometric Society, 1997, pp. 517-555, https://www.jstor.org/stable/2171752
Chicago
Uhlich, Gerald R., Michael Mitzkewitz, and Reinhard Selten. “Duopoly Strategies Programmed by Experienced Players.” Econometrica, 65, .no 3, (Econometric Society: 1997), 517-555. https://www.jstor.org/stable/2171752
APA
Uhlich, G. R., Mitzkewitz, M., & Selten, R. (1997). Duopoly Strategies Programmed by Experienced Players. Econometrica, 65(3), 517-555. https://www.jstor.org/stable/2171752
We are deeply saddened by the passing of Kate Ho, the John L. Weinberg Professor of Economics and Business Policy at Princeton University and a Fellow of the Econometric Society. Kate was a brilliant IO economist and scholar whose impact on the profession will resonate for many years to come.
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