This article concerns an infinite horizon economy where trade must occur pairwise, using a double auction mechanism, and where fiat money overcomes lack of double coincidence of wants. Traders are anonymous and lack market power. Goods are divisible and perishable, and are consumed at every date. Preferences are defined by utility‐stream overtaking. Money is divisible and not subject to inventory constraints. The evolution of individual and economywide money holdings distributions is characterized. There is a welfare‐ordered continuum of single price equilibria, reflecting indeterminacy of the price level rather than of relative prices.
MLA
Green, Edward J., and Ruilin Zhou. “Dynamic Monetary Equilibrium in a Random Matching Economy.” Econometrica, vol. 70, .no 3, Econometric Society, 2002, pp. 929-969, https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00315
Chicago
Green, Edward J., and Ruilin Zhou. “Dynamic Monetary Equilibrium in a Random Matching Economy.” Econometrica, 70, .no 3, (Econometric Society: 2002), 929-969. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00315
APA
Green, E. J., & Zhou, R. (2002). Dynamic Monetary Equilibrium in a Random Matching Economy. Econometrica, 70(3), 929-969. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00315
We are deeply saddened by the passing of Kate Ho, the John L. Weinberg Professor of Economics and Business Policy at Princeton University and a Fellow of the Econometric Society. Kate was a brilliant IO economist and scholar whose impact on the profession will resonate for many years to come.
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