Econometrica

Journal Of The Econometric Society

An International Society for the Advancement of Economic
Theory in its Relation to Statistics and Mathematics

Edited by: Marina Halac • Print ISSN: 0012-9682 • Online ISSN: 1468-0262

Econometrica: Jul, 2026, Volume 94, Issue 4

The Equilibrium Effects of Campaign Finance Deregulation on U.S. Elections

https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA22979
p. 1209-1243

Christian Cox

The U.S. Supreme Court's 2010 decision in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission deregulated campaign finance, enabling the rise of a new political action committee (the Super PAC) with broad freedom to raise and spend money. This led to an unprecedented surge in spending in primary and general elections. To evaluate the impact of Super PACs, I estimate a multistage model of political competition using data from U.S. Congressional elections between 2010 and 2020. I find that Super PAC spending by both sides prompts offsetting responses, resulting in limited net equilibrium effects. However, by amplifying the role of donors, Super PACs still have the potential to reshape the electoral landscape.


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Supplemental Material

Supplement to "The Equilibrium Effects of Campaign Finance Deregulation on U.S. Elections"

Christian Cox

This supplement contains material not found within the manuscript.

Supplement to "The Equilibrium Effects of Campaign Finance Deregulation on U.S. Elections"

Christian Cox

The replication package for this paper is available at https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.17097533. The Journal checked the data and codes included in the package for their ability to reproduce the results in the paper and approved online appendices. Given the highly demanding nature of the algorithms, the reproducibility checks were run on a simplified version of the code, which is also available in the replication package.