New Papers Posted to Theoretical Economics’ Forthcoming Page
The following papers have been accepted and posted to Theoretical Economics’ forthcoming page and may be viewed here: https://econtheory.org/
Monotone contracts
Daniel Bird and Alexander Frug
Quid pro quo: friendly information exchange between rivals
Andreas Blume and In-Uck Park
Prior-free dynamic allocation under limited liability
Sylvain Chassang and Samuel Kapon
Surplus sharing in Cournot oligopoly
Daniele Condorelli and Balázs Szentes
Value-based distance between information structures
Fabien Gensbittel, Marcin Pęski, and Jérôme Renault
Simple contracts with adverse selection and moral hazard
Daniel Gottlieb and Humberto Moreira
Persuasion with unknown beliefs
Svetlana Kosterina
Heterogeneity in decentralized asset markets
Benjamin Lester, Pierre-Olivier Weill, and Julien Hugonnier
Experimentation in Organizations
Sofia Moroni
Equilibrium in a civilized jungle
Ariel Rubinstein and Kemal Yildiz
Informative tests in signaling environments
Ran Weksler and Boaz Zik
Collusion enforcement in repeated first-price auctions
Wenzhang Zhang
